



After a long hiatus, the study of corporate governance has recently en- 
joyed a revival,' but few points of consensus have emerged. Political dif- 
ferences are sometimes responsible for this impasse,' but failure to address 
the economics of corporate governance in microanalytic terms is also a 
factor. Lacking a framework that permits detailed analysis of transactions 
among the various constituencies of the corporation-labor, owners, sup- 
pliers, customers, the community, and management-commentators have 
presented their arguments at such a high level of generality that an assess- 
ment of the merits of the alternative positions is very difficult. This Article 
t Gordon B. Tweedy Professor of Economics of Law and Organization, Yale University. I grate- 
fully acknowledge helpful comments by Reinier Kraakman, Henry Hansmann, and members of my 
class in Economic Organization. 
1. The revival results partly from European efforts to implement co-determination. For recent 
discussions of co-determination, see M. AOKI, THE COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY OF THE FIRM chs. 
10-11 (1984); Jensen & Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Man- 
aged Firms and Co-determination, 52 J. Bus. 469 (1979); Summers, Worker Participation in the 
U.S. and West Germany: A Comparative Study from an American Perspective, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 
367 (1980). 
The year 1982 was also the fiftieth anniversary of Adolf Berle and G.C. Means' celebrated book, 
A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932), and hence 
a natural time to reexamine the issues. See Corporations and Private Property: A Conference Spon- 
sored by the Hoover Institute, 26 J.L. & ECON. 235 (1983) (papers presented at conference celebrat- 
ing fiftieth anniversary of A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra). The on-going Corporate Governance 
Project of the American Law Institute has also provoked commentary. A draft of its work has been in 
progress for four years. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATE- 
MENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 1 1982). The Business Roundtable's response ap- 
pears in THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE ON THE AMERI- 
CAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PROPOSED "PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: 
RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS" (1983). The Business Roundtable's response also includes 
an appendix with papers by Kenneth Andrews, Harold Demsetz, and Paul MacAvoy. See also Scott, 
Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 
927 (1983) (another critique of ALI proposal). 
2. See R. Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform (Sept. 1983) (Working Paper No. 
13, Stan. L. & Econ. Program). 
1197 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.252 on Sun, 2 Jun 2013 19:53:24 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 93: 1197, 1984 
is meant to address that shortcoming. The focus throughout is on publicly 
held corporations in the manufacturing sector.3 
Section I briefly sketches the dilemma of corporate control, originally 
posed as a tension between ownership (stockholders) and control (manag- 
ers), but since expanded to refer to the condition of control among all 
"relevant" constituencies. Section II sets out a contractual framework for 
assessing the merits of the claims of various constituencies to representa- 
tion on the board of directors. Section III then examines whether board 
representation is warranted for each constituency. Section IV discusses the 
corporate governance concerns of an often unmentioned constituency, the 
management. Section V treats the subject of managerial discretion and 
ways of controlling it. Finally, problems of funding worker-managed en- 
terprises are examined in Section VI. 
The premises of this Article are: First, the relation between each con- 
stituency and the firm needs to be evaluated in contractual terms. Second, 
special-purpose governance structures (of which the board of directors is 
one) arise in response to the needs of an exchange relation for contractual 
integrity. And third, lest the design benefits be dissipated, the special pur- 
pose character of each governance structure must be respected. 
Although the board of directors is potentially a broadly representative 
governance structure, I conclude, upon assessing the relation between the 
firm and each constituency in terms of the contractual framework set out 
in Section II, that access to the board of directors should be strictly lim- 
ited. The board is mainly a general purpose control instrument designed 
to safeguard the investments of those who have taken an equity position in 
the firm. Management participation on the board can often facilitate 
shareholder monitoring of the management, however, and can also help to 
safeguard the employment relation between firm and management. Other 
constituencies may sometimes be invited onto the board for the limited 
purpose of sharing information in a timely and credible manner. To as- 
sign other and larger purposes to the board risks impairing its quality and 
yields doubtful benefits. 
I. THE DILEMMA OF CORPORATE CONTROL 
Observers of the corporate scene have long struggled with the dilemma 
of corporate control. This was originally expressed in terms of the strain 
between diffuse ownership and management. It has subsequently been en- 
larged to consider the problems of creating a mechanism to ensure that 
corporate management does right by "labor, suppliers, customers, and 
3. It is thus more limited in scope than the ambitious and insightful treatment of trusteeship 
issues by Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983). 
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owners while simultaneously serving the public interests."' As set out be- 
low, the dilemma is largely attributable to misconceptions that beset the 
study of contract. Although these have theoretical origins, the sheer com- 
plexity of the modern firm is also a contributing factor. Matters would be 
vastly simplified if firms were small and if contracts between the corpora- 
tion and each of its constituencies satisfied the paradigm of contracting 
within discrete markets, where each exchange can accurately be described 
as "sharp in by clear agreement; sharp out by clear performance.", 
Plainly, many corporations have become very large: Sales and assets in 
some of these firms run to tens of billions of dollars, and employment 
numbers in the hundreds of thousands. Contracts between the corporation 
and many of its constituencies routinely deviate from idealized discrete 
contracting. 
Large corporate size was mainly responsible for Berle and Means' 
challenge to the view that the shareholders controlled the modern corpora- 
tion. Since the large size of modern firms often resulted in diffuse owner- 
ship, management purportedly assumed effective control. Berle and 
Means thus inquired whether, under these circumstances, there was "any 
justification for assuming that those in control of a modern corporation 
will also choose to operate it in the interests of the owners."6 The possibil- 
ity that management might operate the corporation in its own interests 
could scarcely be dismissed. 
Other writers broadened the inquiry and argued that the interests of 
other constituencies were frequently undervalued. If transactions between 
these constituencies and the firm are not of the classical, self-liquidating 
kind described by Macneil,7 then additional support for those interests 
may be required. A response that appeals to many students of the corpo- 
ration is to safeguard the interests of all constituencies who have a contin- 
uing stake in the affairs of the firm by awarding them representation on 
the board of directors. 
This activist approach to corporate governance goes well beyond the 
early concern of Berle and Means about the separation of ownership and 
control. It assumes that a condition of "contractual failure" is widespread. 
Thus, L.C.B. Gower observes that "the workers form an integral part of 
the company," and laments that company law in Britain overlooks this 
condition.8 He contends that legal theory maintains a master-servant fic- 
tion that "ignores the undoubted fact that the employees are members of 
4. Mason, The Apologetics of "Managerialism," 31 J. Bus. 1, 7 (1958). 
5. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contract, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 738 (1974). 
6. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 1, at 121. 
7. Macneil, supra note 5, at 720-25. 
8. L. GOWER, THE PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 10 (3d ed. 1969). 
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the company for which they work to a far greater extent than are the 
shareholders whom the law persists in regarding as its proprietors."' 
Masahiko Aoki similarly observes that "the association of individual 
shareholders . . . may not be enduring" and holds that the "employees 
form an integral part of the firm for which they work to a far greater 
extent than [most shareholders]."10 Clyde Summers concurs: 
If the corporation is conceived . . . as an operating institution com- 
bining all factors of production to conduct an on-going business, then 
the employees who provide the labor are as much members of that 
enterprise as the shareholders who provide the capital. Indeed, the 
employees may have made a much greater investment in the enter- 
prise by their years of service, may have much less ability to with- 
draw, and may have a greater stake in the future of the enterprise 
than many of the stockholders. In a corporation, so conceived, em- 
ployee directors have no more conflict of interest than shareholder 
directors."1 
Application of this logic suggests that other constituencies with a long- 
term stake in the enterprise also deserve representation on the board of 
directors. This would go beyond E. Merrick Dodd's proposal that the di- 
rectors of a corporation should serve as trustees for all the constituen- 
cies-shareholders, customers, suppliers, community-that have a stake in 
the corporation.1" What Robert Dahl has referred to as "interest group 
management" would expressly apportion seats on the board of directors to 
corporate constituencies: "Thus the board of directors might consist of 
one-third representatives elected by employees, one-third consumer repre- 
sentatives, one-third delegates of federal, state and local governments."11 
II. FRAMEWORK 
The microanalytic approach within which I propose to examine the is- 
sue of corporate governance is that of "transaction cost economics." I have 
set out the attributes of this approach elsewhere.14 In essence, the ap- 
9. Id. at 1O-11. 
10. M. AOKI, supra note 1, ch. 1. 
11. Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A Projection of Problems and Potentials, J. 
COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 155, 170 (1982). 
12. Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932). 
13. Dahl, Power to the Workers?, N.Y. REV. BooKs, Nov. 19, 1970, at 20. Dahl does not favor 
this solution to corporate governance. His preferred solution is worker self-management. He neverthe- 
less argues that "interest group management would be an improvement over the present arrange- 
ments, and it may be what Americans will be content with, if the corporation is to be reformed at all." 
Id. at 23. 
14. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages To Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. 
REV. 519 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Williamson, Credible Commitments]; Williamson, Transaction 
Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979) [hereinafter 
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roach regards the transaction as the basic unit of analysis and contends 
that a leading but widely neglected purpose of economic organization is to 
economize on the costs of transacting over time. Applications include in- 
termediate product market organization,"' labor market organization," 
and regulation.17 
Neoclassical economics, which regards the firm as a production func- 
tion, holds that nonstandard forms of organization have monopoly purpose 
and effect."8 Transaction cost economics, which regards firms, markets, 
and hybrid "mixed modes" as alternative governance structures, maintains 
instead that the institutions of contract ought mainly to be regarded in 
economizing terms. Assigning transactions to governance structures in 
such a way as to accomplish an economizing result is what transaction 
cost economics is all about. Since any issue that can be posed as a con- 
tracting problem is usefully addressed in transaction cost economizing 
terms,19 and since corporate governance falls within this description, the 
subject of corporate governance becomes grist for the transaction cost eco- 
nomics mill. 
The study of corporate contracting is complicated by interdependencies 
within and between contracts; changes in one set of terms commonly re- 
quire realignments in others. It will nevertheless be instructive to examine 
the contracts of corporate constituencies in a sequential rather than fully 
interactive way. This Article uses a three-part approach to contracting. 
First, I set out a simple schema focusing on the attributes of transactions 
and their needs for governance. Then, I examine measurement issues that 
arise in conjunction with informational asymmetries. Although governance 
and information are not independent," it is useful to deal with them se- 
quentially. Finally, I approach several problems of piecemeal intervention 
by examining "contracting in its entirety." 
cited as Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics]. 
15. See Williamson, Credible Commitments, supra note 14; Williamson, The Vertical Integration 
of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112 (1971). 
16. See Williamson, Efficient Labor Organization (Apr. 1982) (U. Pa. Center for the Study of 
Org. Innovation, Discussion Paper No. 123). 
17. See Williamson, Franchise Biddingfor Natural Monopolies-In General and with Respect to 
CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73 (1976). 
18. Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposalfor Research, in POLICY ISSUES AND RESEARCH 
OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 59, 61-67 (V. Fuchs ed. 1972). 
19. As Friedrich Hayek has observed, "whenever the capacity of recognizing an abstract rule 
which the arrangement of these attributes follows has been acquired in one field, the same master 
mould will apply when the signs for those abstract attributes are evoked by altogether different ele- 
ments." F. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 50 (1967). 
20. See 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICA- 
TIONS 31-37 (1975); Williamson, Credible Commitments, supra note 14, at 526-28. 
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A. A Contractual Schema 
The most important attribute for assessing whether a transaction re- 
quires a special governance structure is the degree to which the parties 
must invest in transaction-specific assets to facilitate the proposed ex- 
change of goods or services.21 Transaction-specific assets are ones whose 
value is much greater in the given transaction than in their next-best use 
or by their next-best user. Failure to distinguish among transactions with 
respect to asset specificity has been responsible for much confusion and 
error in public policy. 
Economists of all persuasions recognize that the terms of an initial bar- 
gain depend on whether qualified suppliers will submit noncollusive bids. 
If there is only a single highly qualified supplier, then the terms of the 
contract will be monopolistic; if there are many such suppliers, then the 
terms will be competitive. Transaction cost economics fully accepts this 
description of pre-contract bidding competition, but also insists that the 
study of contracting be extended to include post-contract features. Thus, 
initial bidding merely sets the contracting process in motion. A full assess- 
ment requires scrutiny of both contract execution and competition at the 
contract renewal interval. 
In contrast to earlier theories, transaction cost economics suggests that a 
large number of bidders at the outset does not necessarily imply that there 
will be a large number thereafter. The efficacy of competition after the 
initial period depends on whether the good or service in question requires 
durable investments in transaction-specific assets, either human or physi- 
cal. An initial winning bidder who makes no specialized investments real- 
izes no advantage over rivals. Although it may continue to supply for a 
long period of time, this is only because, in effect, it is continuously meet- 
ing competitive bids from qualified rivals. 
There is no longer parity with rivals, however, once the initial supplier 
undertakes substantial investments in durable transaction-specific assets. 
In such cases, both buyers and suppliers have a strong interest in preserv- 
ing the continuity of the exchange, since economic values would be sacri- 
ficed if the ongoing supply relation were to be terminated. Rivals who lose 
the bid are unavoidably at a disadvantage if it is important to preserve the 
particular buyer/seller relation once the original contract has been 
awarded. Accordingly, what was a competitive market with a large num- 
21. See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competi- 
tiue Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978); Williamson, Transaction Costs, supra note 
14, at 522-26, 537. Cf 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 20, at 20-40 (discussing idiosyncratic 
investments). 
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ber of bidders at the outset is effectively transformed into one of bilateral 
monopoly thereafter. 
The convenient fiction of faceless contracting is thereby upset. Adapting 
to changing circumstances in bilateral trading poses a serious dilemma in 
contracting. Joined as they are in a condition of bilateral monopoly, both 
buyer and seller can bargain over the disposition of any incremental gain 
whenever a proposal to alter the contract is made by the other party. Al- 
though buyer and seller have a long-term interest in effecting adaptations 
that make both parties better off, each party also has an interest in appro- 
priating as much of the gain as he can from each adaptation. Efficient 
adaptations may thus be made only with costly haggling or may even go 
unmentioned because one party fears that the other's opportunism will 
dissipate the gains. The parties therefore have an incentive to develop gov- 




s = 0 
k> 0 
P>P 
s > 0 
Figure 1 C 
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The two-technology schema set out in Figure 1 helps to illustrate the 
issues. Suppose that there are two types of technology, one of which is 
more appropriate for a given transaction. One is general-purpose technol- 
ogy-technology that is useful over a broad range of transactions and 
therefore involves no exposure of transaction-specific assets. These re- 
sources can be redeployed easily, should either party terminate the con- 
tract. Special purpose technology, by contrast, incorporates transaction- 
specific assets. These cannot be redeployed easily or costlessly if the con- 
tract is prematurely terminated or if continuity of the exchange relation is 
otherwise upset. Using k as a measure of transaction specific assets, trans- 
actions that use the general-purpose technology are ones for which k =0. 
When transactions use special-purpose technology, by contrast, k> O. 
This state takes on the attributes of a bilateral monopoly. 
Although classical market contracting suffices for transactions when 
k =0, unassisted market governance poses hazards whenever transaction- 
specific assets are placed at risk. Parties here have an incentive to develop 
investment safeguards. Let s denote the magnitude of any such safeguards. 
A situation in which s =0 is one in which no safeguards are provided. A 
condition of complete safeguard will obtain if s = k. A refusal to provide a 
contractual safeguard will, of course, show up in the price. If p is the 
price at which the firm procures a good or service when s =0, and if p is 
the price for the same good or service when s >0, then p> p, ceteris 
paribus. 
By way of summary, transactions that are efficiently supported by gen- 
eral purpose assets (k =0) are located at node A and do not need protec- 
tive governance structures. Discrete market contracting suffices. Transac- 
tions that involve significant investments of a transaction-specific kind 
(k >0) are ones for which the parties are effectively engaged in bilateral 
trade. Transactions located at node B enjoy no safeguards (s =0) and thus 
carry a risk premium. Such transactions are apt to be contractually unsta- 
ble. They may revert to node A (in which event the special purpose tech- 
nology would be replaced by general purpose (k =0) technology) or be 
relocated to node C (by introducing contractual safeguards that would 
permit the continued use of the k> 0 technology). Transactions located at 
node C incorporate safeguards (s = k) and thus are protected against the 
hazards of expropriation. 
The safeguards to which I refer normally take one or more of three 
forms. The first is the realignment of incentives, commonly through some 
type of penalty for premature termination." The second is the creation of 
a specialized governance structure to resolve disputes. "Private ordering," 
22. See Mortensen, Specific Capital and Labor Turnover, 9 BELL J. ECON. 572, 579-85 (1978). 
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rather than litigation in the courts, is thus characteristic of node C govern- 
ance.28 The third is the introduction of trading regularities that support 
and signal intentions of continuity." 
B. Informational Asymmetries 
Despite safeguards of these kinds, there may be special circumstances 
where additional benefits would accrue if information pertinent to the ex- 
change were more fully disclosed. Sometimes this disclosure will enable 
the recipient more successfully to anticipate future developments and plan 
accordingly. Sometimes such disclosure will reduce informational asymme- 
tries that, if unrelieved, could lead to disbelief and a costly contractual 
impasse. 
It bears repeating, however, that such disclosures are not needed if as- 
sets are nonspecific. Investment plans do not turn on bilateral trading in 
these circumstances. And where neither party values continuity in its rela- 
tionship with the other, a costly effort to reduce informational asymme- 
tries serves no useful veracity purposes either. 
C. Application to the Board of Directors Generally 
This Article investigates whether constituencies realize net gains by 
having representatives on the board of directors and, if so, in what mem- 
bership capacity. The Article considers two classes of membership: voting 
membership and participation only to secure information. Voting mem- 
bership invites a constituency to participate in what Eugene Fama and 
Michael Jensen refer to as the ratification of corporate decisions and the 
follow-on monitoring of corporate performance."' Informational participa- 
tion allows a constituency to observe strategic planning and to know the 
information on which decisions are based, but allows no vote on invest- 
ments or management. These responsibilities are reserved for the voting 
subset of the board.26 
The question whether there is a prima facie case for representation on 
the board of directors will be assessed for each nodal position. If such a 
23. Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. 
LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1981). 
24. Williamson, Credible Commitments, supra note 14, at 530-33. 
25. Fama & Jensen, supra note 3, at 301, 303 (1983). 
26. Allowing only informational participation to a constituency could be implemented through 
two-tier boards, but more often it takes the form of implicit understandings among the members of the 
board. In principle, members are equals, but a subset understands that its useful participation is 
limited to supplying and receiving information. As Oliver Hart observes, complete information shar- 
ing is not assured by such a practice. Hart, Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Informa- 
tion: An Introduction, 50 REV. ECON. STUD. 3, 23 (1983). However, this form of participation argua- 
bly assures more complete information sharing than nonparticipation. 
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case is found, the next question is: What type of membership is most ap- 
propriate? The Article argues that representation on the board is never 
warranted for constituencies located at node A, but may be warranted for 
constituencies located at node B. The question of why a node B constitu- 
ency has not successfully forged a bilateral governance structure (thereby 
moving to node C) is germane. Finally, constituencies that have forged a 
viable governance structure at node C do not require voting representation 
on the board but sometimes should be included for informational 
purposes. 
Representation is unwarranted for constituencies at node A because of 
the negligible exposure of their transaction-specific assets. Moreover, their 
legitimate interests are adequately safeguarded through neoclassical mar- 
ket contracting. Such constituencies have neither informational nor deci- 
sional needs to be served through board membership. Constituencies lo- 
cated at node B, however, have exposed assets and will charge a higher 
price (p) unless safeguards can be devised. If parties cannot devise effec- 
tive bilateral safeguards, generalized safeguards through voting board 
membership may be warranted. 
Constituencies located at node C do not normally need membership on 
the board of directors to safeguard their interests. Such constituencies have 
devised a structure of bilateral governance to safeguard their interests. 
Such specialized structures will normally be better attuned to the adaptive 
needs and dispute settlement requirements of a constituency than will ac- 
cess to a generalized instrument. If board membership is warranted at all, 
participation should normally be limited to informational access only. 
D. Contracting in Its Entirety 
Suppose, arguendo, that voting membership for node B constituencies is 
granted. Suppose further that constituencies located at node C ask for vot- 
ing participation. Two arguments might be advanced in support of this 
proposal: A spirit of generosity warrants node C inclusion and democratic 
purposes would be served by broadening the board in this way. What are 
the costs? 
One obvious cost is that of supplying information. Huge educational 
needs arise if specialized constituencies are to be informed participants on 
the board. Representatives of each specialized constituency would need to 
learn a great deal about the overall character and agenda of the corpora- 
tion. Such participation also risks deflecting strategic decisionmakers from 
their main purposes by forcing them to redress operating-level complaints. 
This squanders a valuable resource. More serious, however, is the prob- 
lem of opportunism that inclusion of partisan constituencies on the board 
invites. A constituency that had reached a bilateral bargain with the cor- 
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poration would, if it participated in board-level decisions, gain leverage to 
extract additional concessions from the corporation during the execution of 
the contract. Opportunism is especially likely where many partisan con- 
stituencies are represented on the board and logrolling is feasible.28 
"Unwarranted" participation in the decisions of the board of directors 
by such poorly suited constituencies will, moreover, cause subsequent ad- 
aptation by other parties who deal with the firm. For one thing, those 
who are asked to provide general purpose corporate funding will adversely 
adjust the terms under which corporate finance will be made available. 
Moreover, the bilateral contracts affected by the deflection, distortion, and 
dissipation of corporate assets will be realigned. Not only will the original 
terms differ in anticipation of later efforts to strike "better" deals, but 
bilateral safeguards are also apt to be reduced. Node C governance will 
thus move toward node B. In extreme cases, special purpose technologies 
and involvements will give way to general purpose ones, and node A gov- 
ernance will result. Since membership on the board of directors by constit- 
uencies located at node A lacks economic purpose,2 it is naive to believe 
that the board of directors' franchise can be extended without cost. 
III. APPLICATIONS 
These principles can be used to assess the claims to representation on 
the board by labor, owners, suppliers, customers, the community, and 
management. 
A. Labor 
Enthusiasts of co-determination regard participation for informational 
purposes as inadequate. They maintain that co-determination should ex- 
tend the influence of workers to include "general issues of investments, 
market planning, decisions about output, and so forth."30 
This argument is clearly mistaken as applied to workers with general 
purpose skills and knowledge (node A). Such workers can quit and be 
replaced without productive loss to either worker or firm."1 Consider, 
27. This asymmetrical statement appears to ignore the concern of individual constituencies that 
the corporation will make decisions during a contract's execution that are contrary to the spirit of the 
agreement. The concern is real and is discussed infra p. 1227. 
28. There is a related hazard that corporate assets will be dissipated in support of "worthy 
causes" with which specialized constituencies sympathize. Charles Morris's pithy phrase "the cost of 
good intentions" is apposite. C. MORRIS, THE COST OF GOOD INTENTIONS: NEW YORK CITY AND 
THE LIBERAL EXPERIMENT, 1960-1975 (1980). 
29. See supra p. 1201. 
30. Schauer, Critique of Co-Determination, in WORKERS CONTROL 215 (G. Hunnius ed. 1973). I 
do not mean to implicate Shauer, Gower, Aoki, and Summers in this expansive view of labor 
participation. 
31. This is an oversimplification. It assumes easy re-employment and ignores transitional costs, 
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therefore, workers that make firm-specific investments and are located at 
nodes B or C. Ordinarily, it can be presumed that workers and firms will 
recognize the benefits of creating specialized structures of governance to 
safeguard firm-specific assets. Failure to provide such safeguards will 
cause demands for higher wages. Workers located at node B will demand 
a wage T that exceeds what would be required at node C (wz). Although 
workers who are paid a wage T will be less ready to quit, firms that pay 
such a wage premium will terminate prematurely." If firms are required 
to make lump-sum payments upon dismissal and if workers who quit vol- 
untarily are required to make similar sacrifices, a lesser wage (wz) and a 
more efficient termination criterion will result. As Dale Mortensen ob- 
serves: Severance pay serves to rectify firm incentives, while sacrificing 
"paid vacations and nonvested pension plans . . . serve[s] to raise the cost 
of quitting to the worker."83 
Efficient governance, however, requires more than realignment of in- 
centives. The institutions of contract also matter. Machinery for settling 
disputes and for adapting to changed circumstances is needed if continuing 
relations between the firm and workers located at node C are to operate 
smoothly. The grievance machinery and associated job structures-ports 
of entry, promotion ladders, bumping, and so forth"-are thus important 
parts of efficient governance. 
Another important factor is asymmetric information. A chronic diffi- 
culty with long-term labor agreements is that misallocation will result if 
wages are set first and employment levels are unilaterally determined by 
management later. The inefficiency was first noted by Wassily Leontiefp5 
and has since been elaborated upon by Robert Hall and David Lilien36 
and by Masahiko Aoki.37 Even if wages and employment are both estab- 
lished at the outset, the agreement may drift out of alignment during the 
contract's execution to the disadvantage of the less informed member of 
the contracting pair.88 Such a result might be avoided by imparting more 
including the impact on the family. Unemployment insurance may provide a necessary buffer. We 
may want to create some barriers to deter termination without cause and reduce transition costs. The 
basic point, however, is comparative. Workers located at node A have the least concern over 
expropriation. 
32. Mortensen, supra note 22, at 582. 
33. Id. at 581. 
34. See P. DOERINGER & M. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND MANPOWER ANALYSIS 
43, 55, 79, 99-100 (1971). 
35. Leontief, The Pure Theory of the Guaranteed Annual Wage Contract, 54 J. POL. ECON. 76, 
78-79 (1946). 
36. Hall & Lilien, Efficient Wage Bargains Under Uncertain Supply and Demand, 69 AM. 
ECON. REV. 868 (1979). 
37. M. AOKI, supra note 1, at ch. 9. 
38. Id. 
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information to labor. Labor membership on the board of directors for in- 
formational purposes is one means of achieving this result.89 
Labor membership on boards of directors can be especially important 
during periods of actual or alleged adversity, especially when firms are 
asking workers for give-backs. Labor's board membership might mitigate 
worker skepticism by promoting the exchange of credible information.40 
Douglas Fraser's inclusion on the Chrysler board during the company's 
recovery is an illustration. 
This practice does not, however, enjoy widespread support. Some oppo- 
nents fear that it will be difficult to resist the transformation of informa- 
tional roles into decisionmaking participation. It is also possible, however, 
that the informational benefits of labor membership are not adequately 
appreciated. 
B. Owners 
The term "owners" is usually reserved for stockholders, but debt- 
holders may also assume this status. However described, suppliers of 
finance bear a unique relation to the firm: The whole of their investment 
in the firm is potentially placed at hazard. By contrast, the productive 
assets (plant and equipment; human capital) of suppliers of raw material, 
labor, intermediate products, electric power, and the like normally remain 
in the suppliers' possession. If located at node A, therefore, these suppliers 
of finance must secure repayment or otherwise repossess their investments 
to effect redeployment. Accordingly, the suppliers of finance are, in effect, 
always located on the k>O branch. The only question is whether their 
investments are protected well (node C) or poorly (node B). 
39. "[The] true value of codetermination is to be found in its being an instrument through which 
important and accurate information [is shared]." Id. at ch. 10. 
40. As Hart observes, if only the firm and not workers can observe state of the world realizations, 
their "wages cannot be made to depend on the state directly. For if the contract says that wages 
should fall in bad times, then it is in the interest of the firm always to claim that times are bad." 
Hart, supra note 26, at 3. To be sure, there are limits. As ex post information becomes available, 
firms which egregiously understate true conditions will become known and will thereafter carry a 
stigma. Ex ante terms will thereafter be adjusted to their disadvantage. 
41. A recent law review note contends that informational benefits would accrue to the stockholders 
by including union membership on the board of directors. Note, An Economic and Legal Analysis of 
Union Representation on Corporate Boards of Directors, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 919 (1982). The author 
claims that such membership would "reduce the ability of management to run the corporation so as to 
further their own interests rather than those of the shareholders." Id. at 956. If true, the question 
arises why some perceptive shareholders have not recognized the benefits and made provision for 
union participation. Is it ignorance of the gains? Are incumbent managements so well entrenched that 
they can defeat any such efforts? Or are the gains offset by unacknowledged costs? 
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1. Stockholders 
Although a well-developed market in shares permits individual stock- 
holders to terminate ownership easily by selling their shares, it does not 
follow that stockholders as a group have a limited stake in the firm. What 
is available to individual stockholders may be unavailable to stockholders 
in the aggregate. Although some students of governance see only an atten- 
uated relation between stockholders and the corporation, this view is based 
on a fallacy of composition. Stockholders as a group bear a unique rela- 
tion to the firm. They are the only voluntary constituency whose relation 
with the corporation does not come up for periodic renewal.42 Labor, sup- 
pliers in the intermediate product market, debt-holders, and consumers all 
have opportunities to renegotiate terms when contracts are renewed. 
Stockholders, by contrast, invest for the life of the firm and their claims 
are located at the end of the queue should liquidation occur. 
Stockholders are also unique in that their investments are not associated 
with particular assets. The diffuse character of their investments puts 
shareholders at an enormous disadvantage in crafting the kind of bilateral 
safeguards normally associated with node C. Unless, therefore, a govern- 
ance structure of broad scope is somehow devised, stockholders are un- 
avoidably located at node B. 
Recall that the critical attributes of suppliers located at node B are their 
investments in specific assets and the premium they require for their ser- 
vices because of the hazard of expropriation. This premium can be re- 
garded as a penalty imposed on the firm for its failure to craft node C 
safeguards. The incentive for the firm to secure relief from this penalty is 
clear.43 This Article considers the board of directors to be a governance 
structure whose principal purpose is to safeguard those who face a diffuse 
but significant risk of expropriation because the assets in question are nu- 
merous and ill-defined, and cannot be protected in a well-focused, transac- 
tion-specific way." Thus regarded, the board of directors should be seen 
as a governance instrument of the stockholders. Whether other constituen- 
cies also qualify depends upon their contracting relation with the firm. 
Such protection for stockholders can be and often is supplemented by 
other measures. Corporate charter restrictions and informational disclo- 
sure requirements are examples. Firms recognize stockholders' needs for 
42. The public may be regarded as an involuntary constituency whose relation to the corporation 
is indefinite. 
43. Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Capital 
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
44. My use of "diffuse" is different from that of Fama & Jensen, supra note 3. They refer to the 
diffuseness of decisions among many agents in the corporation. My concern is with the diffuseness of 
the investments that are supported by equity finance. 
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controls and many attempt responsibly to provide them.4" Some manage- 
ments, however, play "end games" (undisclosed strategic decisions to cut 
and run before corrective measures can be taken) and individual managers 
commonly disclose information selectively or distort data. Additional 
checks against such concealment and distortion can be devised to give 
shareholders greater confidence. Arguably, an audit committee composed 
of outside directors and the certification of financial reports by an accred- 
ited accounting firm promote these purposes. Another possibility is the 
required disclosure of financial reports to a public agency with powers of 
investigation. The efficacy of these devices is difficult to gauge.40 
2. Lenders 
In certain atypical circumstances, lenders may deserve board represen- 
tation. Unlike stockholders, lenders commonly make short-term loans for 
general business purposes or longer term loans against ear-marked assets. 
Proof that the firm is currently financially sound, coupled with short ma- 
turity, places short-term lenders at node C. Lenders who make longer 
term loans commonly place pre-emptive claims against durable assets. If 
the assets cannot be easily redeployed, lenders usually require partial 
financing through equity collateral. Thus, long-term lenders usually care- 
fully align incentives and protect themselves with safeguards of the sort 
associated with node C. 
As Mervyn King observes, however, firms in countries where the stock 
market is poorly developed are forced to rely more extensively on debt.47 
Adequate safeguards are more difficult to provide in these circumstances. 
45. Diamond, Optimal Release Information by Firms (U. Chi. Center for Research in Security 
Prices, Working Paper No. 102) (1983) (discussing traders' interests in disclosure of information). 
Corporate charter abuses are discussed in Williamson, On the Governance of the Modern Corpora- 
tion, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 63, 74-75 (1979). 
46. George Stigler has nevertheless made an interesting attempt to assess the impact of the SEC. 
Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964). Stigler describes the basic 
test as "simplicity itself . . . . We take all the new issues of industrial stocks with a value exceeding 
$2.5 million in 1923-28, and exceeding $5 million in 1949-55, and measure the values of these issues 
. . .in five subsequent years . . . relative to the market average." Id. at 120. The pre-SEC versus 
post-SEC performance of new issues in relation to the market at one-year intervals is as follows 
(where the first figure is the pre-SEC mean and the second is post-SEC): after one year, 81.9 versus 
81.6; after two years, 65.1 versus 73.3; after three years, 56.2 versus 72.6; after four years, 52.8 versus 
71.9; and after five years, 58.5 versus 69.6. Stigler declares that since these differences are statistically 
significant only in the third and fourth years, the SEC had no effect. 
There are, however, two problems with this argument. First, tests of statistical significance are not 
needed-indeed, are unwarranted-where, as in Stigler's case, the attributes of an entire population, 
rather than a sample thereof, are measured. Second, a more interesting test would be to ascertain 
whether rates of return on equity changed with regulation. Improved information disclosure should 
lead to lower average rates, ceteris paribus. 
47. M. KING, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE CORPORATION 156 (1966). Small firms in developed 
economies may be similarly situated if capital markets are well developed only in the sale of shares of 
large, established firms. 
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As the exposure to risk increases, these debt holders become more con- 
cerned with the details of the firm's operating decisions and strategic 
plans: With high debt-equity ratios the creditors become more like share- 
holders and greater consultation between the management and its major 
creditors results.48 A banking presence in a voting capacity on the board of 
directors may be warranted in these circumstances. More generally, a 
banking presence may be appropriate for firms experiencing adversity, but 
this should change as evidence of recovery accumulates. 
C. Suppliers 
Whether suppliers have a stake in a firm depends upon whether they 
have made substantial investments in durable assets that could not be 
redeployed without sacrificing productive value if the relationship with the 
firm were to be terminated prematurely. The mere fact that one firm does 
a considerable amount of business with another, however, does not estab- 
lish that specific assets have thereby been exposed. At worst, suppliers 
located at node A experience modest transitional expenses if the relation is 
terminated. Neither specialized bilateral governance nor membership on 
the board of directors is needed to safeguard their interests. The protection 
afforded by the market suffices. 
Suppliers who make substantial firm-specific investments in support of 
an exchange will demand either a price premium (as at node B, where the 
projected break-even price is p) or special governance safeguards (as at 
node C). Progress payments and the use of hostages (i.e., credible commit- 
ments) to support exchange are illustrations of node C safeguards.49 An 
agreement to settle disputes through arbitration, rather than through liti- 
gation, is also in the spirit of node C governance. 
Considering the variety of widely applicable governance devices to 
which firms and their suppliers have access, there is little need to accord 
suppliers additional protection through membership on the board of direc- 
tors. There could be exceptions, of course, where a large volume of busi- 
ness is at stake and a common information base is needed to coordinate 
investment planning.50 Ordinarily, however, the governance structure that 
firm and supplier devise at the time of contract (and help to support 
48. Id. 
49. See Williamson, Credible Commitments, supra note 14, at 522-26 (applying "hostage model" 
to clarify unilateral and bilateral exchange). 
50. The information advantage is that the supplier is made privy to the plans of the buyer and 
can satisfy himself on the merits of the internal decisionmaking process. One large Japanese manufac- 
turer volunteered that it had a major supplier (who was close to a co-venturer) on the board for 
information sharing but not decisionmaking purposes. Voting membership on the board of directors is 
apt to be an ineffectual safeguard for a supplier, since it can be ignored or cut off should a firm decide 
to terminate a contract prematurely. 
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through a web of interfirm relationships) will afford adequate protection. 
Membership on the board, if it occurs at all, should be restricted to infor- 
mational participation. 
D. Customers 
The main protection for customers located at node A is generally the 
option to take their trade elsewhere. Products that have delayed health 
effects are an exception, and consumer durables can also pose special 
problems. Membership on the board of directors is not, however, clearly 
indicated for either reason. 
Health hazards pose problems if consumers are poorly organized in re- 
lation to the firm and lack the relevant information. If consumers can 
organize only with difficulty, because they are unknown to one another, or 
because of the ease of free-riding, then a bilateral governance structure 
between firm and consumers may fail to materialize. Protection by third 
parties may be warranted instead. A regulatory agency equipped to re- 
ceive complaints and screen products for health hazards could serve to 
infuse confidence in such markets."' 
Whether consumer membership on the board would afford additional 
protection is problematic. Who are representative consumers? How do 
they communicate with their constituency? Token representation may cre- 
ate only unwarranted confidence. 
Similar problems of consumer organization and ignorance arise in con- 
junction with consumer durables. This is true whether the consumer du- 
rable requires no follow-up service or a great deal of such service.53 
Among the available types of consumer protection are brand names, war- 
ranties, and arbitration panels. Shoppers who choose node B are presuma- 
bly looking for bargains. They will spurn these additional protections in 
favor of a lower price."4 Such customers implicitly accept a higher risk 
51. To be sure, regulation is never without cost. For an overall assessment of the costs and justifi- 
cations for regulation, see S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982). For a discussion of the 
regulatory mentality of the FDA in its efforts to deal with saccharin, see Williamson, Saccharin: An 
Economist's View, in THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATIONS 131 (R. Cran- 
dall & L. Lave eds. 1981). 
52. As Reinier Kraakman observes on a related matter of director selection: Since "corporate 
managers are . . .largely free to control the selection and tenure of outside directors, lawyers, and 
accountants . . . it may be child's play for would-be offenders to select corrupt or captive outsiders 
who are only too willing to assume personal liability for a price." Kraakman, Corporate Liability 
Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 892 (1984). The appointment of recog- 
nized "professional" consumer representatives-those with reputations for being informed and objec- 
tive and who can be penalized for capture or corruption-could mitigate tokenism. But such a solution 
is not unproblematic. 
53. A solid state radio that is replaced rather than repaired when it becomes defective is an exam- 
ple of the former; an automobile of the latter. 
_ 54. In comparing node B with node C in upstream dealings (between a firm and its suppliers), 
p > A. In downstream dealings, by contrast, p < A, since for parties at node C, the firm must 
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and should accept occasional disappointments. There are other consumers, 
however, who value protections at node C. Some are prepared to pay a 
premium for a brand-name item. Brand names effectively extend a firm's 
planning horizon and create incentives for the firm to behave "more 
responsibly.""" (To be sure, these assumptions merit qualification. Firms 
sometimes build up a reputation and thereafter expend it by taking ad- 
vantage of lagging consumer perceptions."') Warranties are explicit forms 
of follow-on protection, and many are available on optional terms. The 
recent introduction of consumer arbitration panels is likewise responsive 
to concerns over consumer protection. Consumers concerned about fair 
play in the post-sales service period will presumably concentrate their 
purchases on brands for which arbitration is available. 
Further innovations to offer consumer protection on a discriminating 
basis may be needed. With the possible exception of large customers with 
special informational needs, however, a general case for inclusion of con- 
sumers on the board of directors is not compelling. 
E. The Community 
Community interest in the corporation is a very large subject. I consider 
two concerns here-externalities and the hazards of appropriation. 
Externalities commonly arise where the parties in question do not bear 
a contracting relation to each other. Pollution is one example. Corrections 
can be interpreted as an effort by the community to impose a contract 
where none existed. For example, the community may place a pollution 
tax (price) on the firm, or it may stipulate that pollution abatement regu- 
lations must be satisfied as a condition for doing business. 
A chronic problem in this area is to secure the knowledge on which to 
base an informed pollution control policy. Firms often possess the neces- 
provide additional protection for which it expects to recover its costs. Although workers will accept a 
lesser wage to locate at node C, customers must therefore pay a higher price. 
55. Problems arise when established firms with apparent commitments to an industry decide to 
cut losses and terminate. The home computer market is a recent illustration. Andrew Pollack de- 
scribes Texas Instruments' decision to terminate: 
The losing battle of Texas Instruments Inc. in the home computer market has taken a severe 
toll on the company's finances, its reputation and its employees. Yet more than one million 
other people-the owners of the Texas Instruments 99/4A home computers-will suffer as 
well. 
They are likely to find it much more difficult to get their machines repaired and to find new 
programs and peripheral equipment, such as data storage devices and printers, to use with the 
machines. 
Texas Instruments' Pullout, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1983, at D1, col. 3. The purchasers of the TI99/ 
4A, who had struck an implicit bargain with Texas Instruments but went uncompensated when the 
decision to terminate was made, were the losers. 
56. Cf. Beales, Craswell & Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & 
ECON. 491, 501-13 (1981) (surveying generally the impact of market forces on the dissemination of 
consumer information). 
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sary knowledge and may disclose it only in a selective or distorted manner. 
Public membership on the board of directors could conceivably reduce 
misinformation. But the remedy would come at a high cost if the corpora- 
tion were thereby politicized or deflected from its chief purpose of serving 
as an economizing instrument. Penalties against misinformation coupled 
with moral suasion may be more effective. This is an area in which there 
may simply be no unambiguously good choices. 
The hazards of expropriation are even less of a justification for public 
membership on boards. Communities often construct durable infrastruc- 
tures to support a new plant or renewal investments by old firms. Expro- 
priation is possible if the firm is able to capitalize these public investments 
and realize a gain upon selling off the facility. Such concerns are much 
greater if the firm makes general-purpose rather than special investments. 
Communities that make investments in support of a firm should therefore 
scrutinize the character of the investments that the firm itself makes. 
As elsewhere, expropriation hazards will be mitigated if the parties can 
locate themselves at node C. Insistence that the firm make specialized in- 
vestments is akin to the use of hostages to support exchange. In general, 
specially crafted node C protection, rather than public membership on the 
board of directors, has much to commend it as the main basis for safe- 
guarding community investments. 
IV. MANAGEMENT AS A CONSTITUENCY 
There is one constituency that curiously goes unmentioned in most dis- 
cussions of corporate governance: the management. Perhaps analysts as- 
sume that management is appropriately assigned a mediation role between 
contesting constituencies.57 And some critics maintain that management is 
already over-represented in the affairs of the firm: Management partici- 
pation on the board of directors is the problem, not the solution. This 
Article's contracting framework, however, allows us to view management 
as a separate constituency whose relation to the firm can be evaluated like 
that of other constituencies. 
A. Management Contracting 
A major difficulty in treating management's contract with the corpora- 
tion like those of other constituencies is that management is thought to be 
in effective control of the corporation. Rather than being responsive agents 
of the stockholders, managers may operate the firm with a keen eye to 
their own interests. Any proposal to improve their terms of employment is 
57. See M. AOKI, supra note 1, ch. 8; A. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY 8 (1959) (com- 
paring businessmen to politicians who must respond to multiple constituencies). 
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automatically suspect, because managers are presumed merely to be ad- 
ding another layer of down to their already well-feathered nests. This 
section will suspend judgment on this matter and treat managers like 
other constituencies: What attributes does the management-corporation 
contract have and what ones should it have? 
Since no firm-specific human assets are exposed by managers located at 
node A, no specialized governance is needed. Like any other constituency 
with attributes of node A, such managers look to the market for basic 
protection. Managers who develop a firm-specific asset relationship with 
the firm, however, are located at nodes B or C. 
Those managers who contract with the firm in a node B manner will 
receive higher current compensation than those who are accorded internal 
governance protection of a node C kind. This is the familiar p> p result. 
To what types of governance protection do managers located at node C 
have access? The answers are unclear, partly because the proposition that 
governance structures can and do promote the mutual interest of con- 
tracting parties is relatively novel. Such structures have either been ig- 
nored or, as in the case of labor unions, treated as instruments of power 
whereby labor improves the wage bargain at the expense of the firm. To 
be sure, this sometimes occurs. But the collective organization of workers 
can also reduce hazards of contracting, to the benefit of both parties, if 
workers develop firm-specific skills during the course of their employment. 
We can take the same analytical approach to understanding contractual 
relations between management and firm, but the job is more difficult than 
understanding labor-firm contracting. Labor organization has been the 
subject of repeated studies, and much of the relevant microanalytics there 
has been carefully described,"8 but contracting by management has re- 
ceived much less systematic attention. There are several reasons for this. 
Management contracts tend to be crafted individually rather than collec- 
tively, and they are not subject to public scrutiny. The protections or pro- 
cedures to which an aggrieved manager turns are usually not formally 
organized and are more difficult to study for this reason. Further, treating 
the firm and its management as separate contracting entities is admittedly 
more difficult with the highest echelons of management. Unless an inde- 
pendent compensation committee exists, for example, our understanding 
of the contract between firm and manager is complicated by the fact that 
managers apparently write their own contracts with one hand and sign 
them with the other. Also, management is often encouraged, for good rea- 
son, to think of itself and the firm as one. It would not sit well with this 
58. See P. DOERINGER & M. PIORE, supra note 34. 
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conception for managers to develop a formal grievance machinery to 
which they can turn for relief and redress.59 
It is nonetheless true that managers who are asked to make firm- 
specific investments will presumably strike different (better) terms if they 
locate at node C than at node B.60 What kinds of protection are available? 
B. Compensation Schemes 
Both the firm and its managers should recognize the merits of drafting 
compensation packages that deter both hasty dismissals and unwanted de- 
partures. Requiring firms to make severance payments upon dismissal and 
managers to sacrifice nonvested rights should they quit would help safe- 
guard specific assets. The recent phenomenon of "golden parachutes," for 
example, illustrates both the right and the wrong way to craft protections 
for managers. 
Golden parachutes are severance payments to senior managers that are 
contingent upon an "adverse" change in the ownership of common shares 
in the firm, usually as a result of unfriendly takeovers. Since the appear- 
ance and refinement of takeover techniques expose managers to new risks, 
some response is arguably warranted. Senior managers are often dismissed 
after takeovers. Even if the managers are kept on, the takeover often up- 
sets their career expectations. Upon recognizing these hazards, managers 
will attempt to renegotiate their contracts to reflect these risks. 
The golden parachute can be thought of as such a response. If an ad- 
verse change of ownership occurs, the senior management does not have to 
wait to be dismissed in order to receive severance pay. Instead, the man- 
agement can trigger the award itself. Managers are thus given the option 
to "bail out" and collect a larger severance award than they would be 
entitled to after a "normal" dismissal (one that is independent of an own- 
ership change). Without this safeguard, the post-takeover management 
could give demeaning assignments to incumbent managers and force them 
to quit, thus denying them any severance award. 
59. As Alan Fox puts it, "High level managers and administrators whose decisions cannot be 
easily or quickly monitored are treated as members of a high-trust fraternity," lest their moral in- 
volvement deteriorate. A. Fox, BEYOND CONTRACT: WORK, POWER AND TRUST RELATIONS 170-71 
(1974). 
60. In principle, either of two contractual adaptations could be made in response to the added risk 
that takeover poses. One is that managers who have made firm-specific investments could demand and 
receive higher salaries. Golden parachutes are the second alternative. The first is a node B (m) re- 
sponse; the second is a node C (p) response whereby the added risk elicits added safeguards. If the 
efficiency properties of the latter are superior, as they arguably are, see Williamson, Credible Commit- 
ments, supra note 14, at 537-38, the golden parachute is appropriate. Indeed, since managers who 
receive a salary premium rather than added severance payments will expend supranormal efforts to 
defeat a takeover attempt and save their high paying jobs, the stockholders will presumably prefer a 
node C solution. 
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Granting the merit of self-initiated severance pay, what explains the 
severance premium? The defense for such a premium presumably resides 
in the differences between dismissals from normal employment and dis- 
missals that occur in conjunction with takeovers. Dismissals from normal 
employment are generally for cause, and they activate some protection (al- 
beit diffuse) under an internal due process machinery.6' After takeovers, 
an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and hostility often exists, and the suc- 
cessful bidders are concerned that incumbents will sabotage the transition. 
Dismissals after takeovers are commonly unrelated to job performance 
and relatively unprotected by any internal machinery. Because of these 
added risks, larger severance awards for terminations that occur in con- 
junction with takeovers are arguably warranted. 
This explanation, however, merely establishes that golden parachute 
awards will exceed those for termination from normal employment. Some 
perspective on the magnitude of golden parachutes is needed. Golden 
parachutes ought to vary directly with the extent of the firm-specific in- 
vestment that a manager has placed at risk. The absolute value of the 
pension and other benefits that an executive sacrifices should he volunta- 
rily quit is one measure of these investments. Absence of penalties for 
voluntary quitting is prima facie evidence that the management skills are 
general purpose rather than firm-specific. Golden parachute protection for 
these managers is unwarranted and probably reflects self-dealing.63 
61. Informal organizations may provide due process protection. Cf. C. BARNARD, THE FUNC- 
TIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE 122 (1938) (discussing how informal organization functions to maintain 
feelings of personal integrity and self-respect among executives). 
62. Takeover effectively suspends many of the due process benefits of internal organization until a 
new set of implicit bargains is struck. 
63. Executives in specialized firms (monopolies or firms that are serving very special niches) are 
more apt to qualify for golden parachutes than those in competitively organized industries where 
experience in one firm easily transfers to another. 
A systematic assessment of the variety of golden parachute terms is sorely needed. Considerable 
variety in golden parachute provisions is evident from the following Wall Street Journal article: 
The modest plan of AVX Corp., a Great Neck, N.Y. electronic components maker, would 
provide Chairman Marshall Butler with nine months pay of about $100,000 if he is ousted in 
a takeover. Beneficial Corp.'s plan, on the other hand, covers 250 "key" executives and pro- 
vides each with three years' pay and benefits if they determine their jobs have been altered 
after a change of control; the diversified financial services concern refuses to estimate the po- 
tential total cost of its plan but its five top executives alone earned almost $1.6 million in fiscal 
1982 and it could easily exceed $40 million. 
A few plans cover directors as well as executives. Just before Brunswick Corp. fought off a 
takeover bid by Whittaker Corp. earlier this year, its board approved parachutes for outside 
directors 55 years of age or older with five years' service. It voted to pay them their annual 
retainers ($22,000) and company benefits for life if they chose to "retire" in connection with a 
hostile acquisition; the health, recreation and technology company's 11 top officers, some of 
whom also were directors, received parachutes guaranteeing them up to five years' pay in the 
same package .... 
Companies give various reasons for instituting golden parachutes. While most at least imply 
that their plans will ensure that top executives won't arbitrarily oppose takeover bids that 
would reward shareholders, a few advance them frankly as anti-takeover measures. For exam- 
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C. Board Membership 
Suppose that the appropriate alignments of incentive have been worked 
out. Can the firm realize additional improvements by including the man- 
agement on the board of directors? Putting the issue this way presumes 
that the central function of the board is to safeguard the interests of the 
stockholders. Such a conception of the board has been described by others 
as the "monitoring model." Kenneth Andrews characterizes the monitor- 
ing model as simplistic, overformal, and self-defeating." Paul MacAvoy 
and his collaborators contend that serious efforts to implement the moni- 
toring model could have a "pervasive negative effect . . . on risk 
taking.""" 
Both, of course, may be correct. But neither Andrews nor MacAvoy 
and his collaborators advance an alternative conception of the board in 
which a clear sense of contractual purpose is described. Andrews' favored 
model is what he refers to as the "participative board." The outside board 
members are invited to join with the management to enhance the quality 
of strategic decisions." Such involvement can come at a high cost, how- 
ever, if objectivity is thereby sacrificed. As Donald Campbell remarks, if 
an "administrative system has committed itself in advance to the correct- 
ness and efficacy of its reforms, it cannot tolerate to learn of failure." 7 
This defensive propensity is the origin of the tendency to throw good 
money after bad. A less informed but more skeptical posture by outsiders 
may well be superior. 
Since managers enjoy huge informational advantages because of their 
full-time status and inside knowledge, the participating board easily be- 
comes an instrument of the management. Notwithstanding the variety of 
checks against managerial discretion described by MacAvoy and his col- 
laborators, the interests of the stockholders-indeed, of all major constitu- 
encies68-are apt to be sacrificed as a consequence. 
pie, last year directors of Grey Advertising Inc. gave its chairman and president, Edward H. 
Meyer, a $3 million parachute as part of a number of changes it said, "may make the com- 
pany less susceptible to a successful takeover attempt" by making a takeover more expensive. 
At the time it was adopted, Mr. Meyer's parachute was worth about 8% of the value of all the 
company's common stock. 
Klein, A Golden Parachute Protects Executives, But Does it Hinder or Foster Takeovers?, Wall St. J., 
Dec. 8, 1982, at 56, col. 1. 
64. Andrews, Rigid Rules Will Not Make Good Boards, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1982, at 
34, 44-46. 
65. MacAvoy, Cantor, Dana & Peck, ALI Proposals for Increased Control of the Corporation by 
the Board of Directors: An Economic Analysis, in THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 1, Exhibit 
C, at C-24. 
66. Andrews, supra note 64, at 44. 
67. Campbell, Reforms as Experiments, 24 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 409, 410 (1969). 
68. This result depends upon viewing the contracting process in its entirety. A narrow slice-of- 
time approach is likely to reach a different result. Barnard recognized that employment relations have 
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Rejection of the participating model in favor of a control model of the 
decision ratification and monitoring kind does not, however, imply that 
the management should be excluded altogether. So long as the basic con- 
trol relation of the board to the corporation is not upset, management's 
participation on the board affords three benefits. First, it permits the 
board to observe and evaluate the process of decisionmaking as well as the 
outcomes. The board thereby gains superior knowledge of management's 
competence which can help it to avoid appointment errors or to correct 
them more quickly. Second, the board must make choices among compet- 
ing investment proposals. Management's participation may elicit more 
and better information than a formal presentation would permit. Finally, 
management's participation may help safeguard the employment relation 
between management and the firm-an important function in view of the 
inadequacy of formal grievance procedures. 
According to the contractual conception advanced here, however, these 
are supplemental purposes. To the extent that management participation 
permits reviews on the merits to be done more responsibly and serves to 
safeguard an employment relationship that would otherwise be exposed to 
excessive risk, management may be added to the core membership. But 
the principal function of the board remains that of providing governance 
structure protection for the stockholders. Management participation 
should not become so extensive as to upset this basic board purpose. 
V. MANAGERIAL DISCRETION 
A. The Inadequacies of Neoclassical Models 
Enthusiasts of laissez-faire capitalism are loath to confront, and are 
sometimes schizophrenic on, the subject of managerial discretion. Focusing 
on any given time, they commonly deny the existence of managerial dis- 
cretion. Taking a long-term perspective, however, these same enthusiasts 
mutual enforcement effects: 
Since the efficiency of organization is affected by the degree to which individuals assent to 
orders, denying the authority of an organization communication is a threat to the interests of 
all individuals who derive a net advantage from their connection with the organization, unless 
the orders are unacceptable to them also. Accordingly, at any given time there is among most 
of the contributors an active personal interest in the maintenance of the authority of all orders 
which to them are within the zone of indifference. The maintenance of this interest is largely a 
function of informal organization. 
C. BARNARD, supra note 61, at 169. 
Alchian puts the same argument in more general terms: 
[A]nyone vulnerable to [a] threat of loss [if the coalition is impaired] will seek to preserve not 
only the coalition but also to reduce the possibility of that threat from the other members of the 
coalition to expropriate the quasi-rent of the specific resource. 
A. Alchian, Specificity, Specialization and Coalitions 9 (June 1983) (presented at Seminar on New 
Inst. Econ., W. Ger.). 
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point with pride to the development of new techniques that have brought 
managerial discretion under more effective control. 
To be sure, the earlier condition may have been irremediable: The cor- 
rective instruments to which investors had access at that time could have 
been, indeed arguably were, fully deployed. But it is inconsistent to em- 
ploy the very same neoclassical model-whereby the firm is characterized 
as a production function to which a profit maximization objective is 
ascribed-at both the earlier and later dates. A conception of the firm in 
which opportunities for managerial discretion are expressed as a function 
of the control instruments is needed instead. Such a conception leads to 
greater respect for successive organizational innovations that have superior 
control properties and that squeeze out managerial discretion. 
The assumption of single-minded profit maximization is disputed by 
recent treatments that regard the firm as a contracting entity. Participants 
need to agree upon terms and implement the contracts. Since contracts are 
rarely self-enforcing, the possibility of managerial discretion must at least 
be admitted. What, then, is the machinery by which managerial discretion 
is held in check? MacAvoy and his co-authors maintain that it is the "in- 
terplay" of a variety of instruments: 
Corporate chartering laws of the states limit corporate activities 
and procedures, and state laws of duty of care and loyalty, along 
with the business judgment rule, restrict self-dealing and negligence 
amongst management and the board of directors. 
Market incentives also exist to discipline behavior. Efficiency is 
forced on the corporation by competition in the capital markets, the 
markets for management resources, and the market for corporate 
control, and the general market for selling the company's goods and 
services. 
In addition to these external constraints, there is internal oversee- 
ing. Formally, this is embodied in the board of directors and corpo- 
rate by-laws. However, almost all internal overseeing takes place 
more informally, within management. Fama and Alchian-Demsetz 
have articulated a view of the firm as a group of team players with 
each player acting in his or her own self interest. Yet, each player's 
ability to achieve his or her individual objectives is likely to be a 
positive function of other team players' productivity, including those 
both above and below in the hierarchical level.69 
These authors do not indicate the relative importance of the various 
processes or describe the interplay between them. They evidently believe, 
however, that the ex post settling up processes described by Fama are 
69. MacAvoy, Cantor, Dana & Peck, supra note 65, at C-13 to C-14 (citations omitted). 
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important;70 and they are specifically attracted to the Alchian-Demsetz 
formulation. They observe with respect to the latter: 
. . . [Tihe firm in effect is organized into a set of team players with 
some one or group in a central position of making contractual ar- 
rangements with the others. Overseeing takes the form of both mea- 
suring productivity (organization of the inputs) and handing out ad- 
ditional rewards for higher productivity. Team players act to oversee 
themselves in achieving a common goal with the implicit understand- 
ing that the productivity of the team as a whole is tied to each indi- 
vidual player's reward. At a certain point, though, leisure will be- 
come preferable to pecuniary rewards and "shirking" will result. An 
employer or manager of a division then acts as an overseer to prevent 
this shirking. The overseer, himself, is given incentive not to shirk by 
receiving rewards for additional productivity of his team. For exam- 
ple, managers of divisions often receive a bonus for reaching a cer- 
tain level of sales or production.71 
Useful though this team conception of economic organization may be for 
some purposes, it is very limited for others.72 Whatever model of the 
board of directors is adopted, an accurate assessment of managerial discre- 
tion requires that organizational form be taken into consideration. 
B. The Transformation of the Modern Corporation: 1930-1960 
Managerial discretion can take numerous forms, some very subtle. Indi- 
vidual managers may run slack operations; they may pursue subgoals that 
are at variance with corporate purposes; they may engage in self-dealing. 
Such distortions become more severe where there is logrolling." These 
and other manifestations of managerial discretion were well-known to 
Berle and Means, Mason, and other observers of the corporate scene. 
What went unnoticed, however, was the vast transformation of the corpo- 
rate form between 1930 and 1960 and the consequences for managerial 
discretion. The earlier, centralized, functionally organized, unitary (or U- 
70. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980). 
71. MacAvoy, Cantor, Dana, & Peck, supra note 65, at C-19. 
72. At the very time that MacAvoy and his colleagues were embracing the team formulation, 
Alchian acknowledged that the firm is more usefully regarded in the contractual terms described 
above. Although he and Demsetz had earlier asserted that "Long term contracts between employer 
and employee are not the essence of the organization we call a firm," he admitted in 1983 that "[i]n 
the light of Williamson's [1975] analysis that assertion is incorrect." A. Alchian, supra note 68, at 14. 
He goes on to observe with respect to the board of directors that directorsos need not direct managers; 
instead they detect and evaluate managers' performance and may replace them." Id. at 26. This is 
plainly closer to the monitoring model of the board than it is to the participative model favored by 
Andrews or to the interplay (or free-style) model of MacAvoy and his colleagues. 
73. See A. CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF INDUS- 
TRIAL ENTERPRISE 127 (1962) (discussing logrolling by GM management in pre-Chandler era). 
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form) structure of the corporation was progressively supplanted by the 
multidivisional (or M-form) structure. 
The direct effects of the M-form innovation on corporate performance 
were two-fold. First, the shift from a functional to a divisional form served 
to rationalize decisionmaking. The confusion of purposes that character- 
ized the U-form firm, where everything was treated as though it were 
connected with everything else, was supplanted by a divisionalized struc- 
ture where separability among quasi-autonomous parts was emphasized. 
Restructured corporations realized sharper definition of purpose and sav- 
ings in informational costs, and economies of bounded rationality resulted. 
Disengaging the general office from operating affairs also improved in- 
centives. As Chandler put it, "the psychological commitment" of the firm's 
top executives was changed.74 What had been short-run, partisan involve- 
ments by top executives who had previously been heads of functional ac- 
tivities (e.g., manufacturing, marketing, finance) gave way to longer-run, 
strategic decisionmaking. Executives gave precedence to objectives of the 
enterprise over functional responsibilities. The general office of the mul- 
tidivisional structure monitored the performance of the divisions, allocated 
resources to high-valued uses, and used internal incentives and controls in 
a discriminating way. M-form organization thereby attenuated manage- 
rial discretion in what had previously been U-form firms. 
These organizational innovations also had indirect effects in product 
and capital markets that changed managerial discretion in many firms. 
The immediate beneficiaries of the M-form structure were the firms that 
first implemented the changes. The benefits showed up on their income 
statements as profits. But as such cost savings continue, the initial bulge in 
profits is normally dissipated by the "handing on" forces discussed by 
Schumpeter.75 Competitors adopt innovations and the forces of competi- 
tion in the product market restore rates of return to competitive (or pre- 
innovative) levels. Cost savings are thereby transferred to the public at 
large. To be sure, patents can delay the spread of technological innova- 
tions, and the merits of organizational innovations are often difficult to 
recognize so that imitation is delayed. But the forces of rivalry eventually 
intrude.7 The effects are not limited to forces of competition in the prod- 
uct market; competition in the capital market is also affected. 
Two kinds of effects of competition in the capital market can be distin- 
74. Id. at 309. 
75. See J. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIc DEVELOPMENT 3-56 (1934). 
76. Even if price-to-cost ratios are not fully restored to pre-innovative levels, the cost savings 
realized by innovations release productive resources to be employed elsewhere in the economy. Net 
welfare gains commonly result. Cf. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare 
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968) (cost savings associated with modest price effects yield 
welfare gains). 
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guished. The first kind applies to all innovations, technological and orga- 
nizational alike. The second applies to a particular subset of organiza- 
tional changes, of which the M-form innovation is one. The general 
argument is that unrealized profit opportunities-from whatever 
source-always invite corrective action. Of course, redress may be costly 
to effectuate. But if incumbent managers have already pressed managerial 
discretion beyond the threshold of stockholder discontent, failure to adopt 
a new innovation that would bring large savings invites an effort to dis- 
place management. 
It has often been noted that tender offers increasingly replaced proxy 
contests as a takeover technique beginning in the late 1950's." What ex- 
plains this? Gregg Jarrell and Michael Bradley contend that the costs of 
proxy contests were increased by new regulations:78 Takeovers are a regu- 
lation-induced change in the relative price of the methods for gaining 
control. 
This is an interesting hypothesis, but it would be more compelling if 
proxy contests actually had been widely and successfully used to challenge 
incumbent managements before these rule changes. In fact, proxy contests 
were never numerous and were usually unsuccessful. Moreover, although 
regulations on proxy contests could help to elicit a takeover response, why 
should a switch to this (previously inferior) device be associated with a 
larger number of contests for corporate control and a greater degree of 
success? 
In principle, takeover by tender offer was always feasible. I submit that 
the reason why it was not employed earlier is that a corporate structure 
conducive to takeover was not yet in place. Specifically, reorganization of 
the corporation from a functionally departmentalized to a divisionalized 
structure had profound consequences for corporate control. Conceiving of 
77. As Gregg Jarrell and Michael Bradley observe: "Cash takeover bids were very rare in the 
United States prior to the 1960's, but they burst onto the financial scene in the mid-1960's, a period of 
much corporate conglomeration." Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Reg- 
ulations of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J.L. & ECON. 371, 371 n.1 (1980). 
78. They cite the work of Peter Dodd, who 
associated the sudden emergence of cash tender offers as a takeover device with the successive 
expansions in 1955 and 1964 (Securities Acts Amendment) by the SEC of its rules governing 
proxy contents [sic] . . . [T]hese changes in proxy rules increased insurgents' costs of assuming 
corporate control via the proxy and, therefore, increased usage of the cash tender offer to 
achieve a change in management. 
Id. 
As Henry Manne puts it: "The most dramatic and publicized of the take-over devices is the proxy 
fight; it is also the most expensive, the most uncertain, and the least used of the various techniques." 
Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 1 10, 114 (1965). From 
1956 to 1960, only nine of the 28 proxy fights for control were fully successful. Hayes & Taussig, 
Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HARV. Bus. REV. 135, 137 (1967). Proxy contests that aim less for 
control than for bargaining advantages seem to have come into vogue more recently. 
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the firm as a governance structure rather than as a production function is 
the key to understanding the phenomenon of takeover by tender offer. 
In takeovers, the main advantage of an M-form firm over a U-form 
enterprise is the ability of an M-form acquiror to "digest" its acquisition. 
The acquired firm is normally assigned profit center status and thereafter 
becomes subject to the corporation's internal incentive, control, and re- 
source allocation processes. The firm does not attempt comprehensively to 
integrate the new assets with the old. Inasmuch as M-form firms separate 
operating from strategic decisionmaking, the general office neither seeks 
nor requires the same familiarity with the operating parts that managers 
in U-form firms must have. The greater competence of the large M-form 
firm to manage extant assets thus applies to the management of acquired 
assets as well. 
For the reasons sketched out above and elaborated elsewhere,79 the re- 
organization of a U-form firm into an M-form enterprise has beneficial 
effects on pursuit of goals, monitoring, staffing, and resource allocation. 
Since the general management of an M-form firm is disengaged from rou- 
tine operations, there is a presumption that the general office favors prof- 
its over functional goals. The general office can be regarded as an agency 
of the stockholders that monitors the operations of the constituent parts. 
Monitoring benefits are realized because internal monitors enjoy advan- 
tages over external monitors in access to information.80 The differential 
ease with which the general office can change ineffectual or recalcitrant 
managers and reassign duties helps to effect superior staffing. There are 
also benefits from better resource allocation because cash flows no longer 
return automatically to their origins but instead revert to the center, from 
which they can be allocated among competing uses in accordance with 
prospective yields. 
Plainly, the M-form firm takes on many of the features that are nor- 
mally associated with capital markets. Indeed, the M-form firm is usefully 
regarded as a miniature capital market. Such a corporate structure never- 
theless poses a tradeoff of breadth for depth. As Alchian and Demsetz put 
it, efficientet production with heterogeneous resources is a result not of 
having better resources but in knowing more accurately the relative pro- 
ductive performances of those resources."8 Diversification can, however, 
be taken to excess-in which case the M-form's competence to manage 
assets breaks down. Voluntary divestiture in the form of spin-offs or buy- 
79. 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 20, at 132-75. The major condition is that the acquiring M- 
form firm does not diversify to excess-i.e., in a way that prevents it from competently evaluating and 
allocating funds among the diverse activities. 
80. See id. at 145-48. 
81. Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. 
ECON. REV. 777, 793 (1972). 
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outs of subsidiaries is a manifestation of this condition. Absent such 
strains on managerial competence, internal capital markets both extend 
benefits to and receive benefits from the external capital markets. 
The managerial discretion that was of concern to Berle and Means in 
1932 was thus vastly transformed by organizational innovations and asso- 
ciated capital market effects over the next thirty years. Students of the 
corporation, however, were reluctant to concede the importance of organi- 
zational form. Disputes between skeptics and enthusiasts of Berle and 
Means thus continued without reference to intervening organizational 
changes.8 
VI. WORKERS' COOPERATIVES 
A robust approach to the study of economic organization will apply 
equally well to both capitalist and noncapitalist forms. A brief sketch of 
the contracting approach to the problems of financing workers' coopera- 
tives is set out here. Branko Horvat poses the dilemma directly: "If labor- 
managed firms are really more efficient than their capitalist . . . counter- 
parts, . . . why do they not outcompete the latter firms in the market?"83 
His answer: "[A] labor-managed firm cannot easily survive in a capitalist 
environment regardless of its potential efficiency."84 A principal reason 
for this difficulty is the inability of workers' cooperatives to secure ade- 
quate bank and trade credit.85 Horvat offers a biological analogy: "[The 
capitalist economy behaves like an organism that has undergone an organ 
transplant: it spontaneously rejects the alien tissue."8 This is a class- 
interest explanation. 
I submit however that, at least in the short term, bank and trade credit 
are more accurately described by a physical analogy. They are more 
nearly akin to iron filings in a magnetic field. The prospect of high (risk- 
adjusted) returns presents a well-nigh irresistible attraction to liquid 
reserves. To be sure, local exhortations to discriminate can be temporarily 
effective. But venture capitalists are unprincipled in their search for 
profit. Capital displays an inexorable tendency to equalize returns at the 
margin. 
Consider, therefore, the possibility that an objective assessment of eco- 
nomic risks, rather than political hostility, is responsible for the difficulties 
to which Horvat refers. If financial dealings with a workers' cooperative 
82. This section follows the argument earlier set out in Williamson, Credible Commitments, supra 
note 14. 
83. B. HORVAT, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOCIALISM 455 (1982). 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 456. 
86. Id. 
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are subject to a greater hazard, then such cooperatives will face adverse 
terms. And although short-term bank and trade credit for workers' coop- 
eratives involve limited risk exposure, long-term bank financing and eq- 
uity capital will almost surely carry a risk premium. 
The cooperative firm and the capitalist firm pose distinguishably differ- 
ent expropriation hazards for holders of long-term finance, especially for 
holders of equity. The dilemma for workers' cooperatives is that workers 
cannot simultaneously ask for long-term financing to purchase firm- 
specific durable assets and refuse those who provide such funding the op- 
portunity to intervene if the management of the cooperative thereafter dis- 
sipates (expropriates) these investments. Louis Putterman correctly per- 
ceives the dilemma when he observes that "if equity-owners value their 
voting control over firm policies, and if worker-run firms cannot (on prin- 
ciple) share such control with their equity owners, then the costs of rais- 
ing equity-capital will be higher for the worker-run firm."'87 Inasmuch as 
rational equity owners will insist on such safeguards, and because the 
sharing of control to which Putterman refers is antithetical to the worker- 
managed enterprise, the statement would read more accurately if the two 
uses of "if" were replaced by "since."88 Problems of workers' cooperatives 
thus fall into clearer relief under the light of the contractual schema.69 
CONCLUSION 
Some commentators maintain that the corporation is made up of many 
constituencies-owners, suppliers, employees, customers, community, and 
managers-all of whom deserve a voice in corporate governance and 
therefore a place on the board of directors. Others regard this proposal as 
87. Putterman, Some Behavioral Perspectives on the Dominance of Hierarchical over Democratic 
Forms of Enterprise, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 139, 158 (1982). 
88. Robert Dahl holds contrary views on this matter: 
I do not see why a board of directors elected by the employees could not select managers as 
competent as those selected by a board of directors chosen by banks, insurance companies, or 
the managers themselves. The board of a self-governing firm might hire a management team 
on a term contract in the way that a board of directors of a mutual fund often does now-and 
also fire them if they are incompetent. If the "profit motive" is all that it has been touted to be, 
who would have more at stake in improving the earnings of a firm than employees, if the 
management were responsible to them rather than to stockholders? 
Dahl, supra note 13, at 21. The differences between Dahl's assessment and mine are: (1) The assets 
of a mutual fund can be instantly liquidated at objective market values; (2) Comparative assessments 
of mutual fund managers are easy; (3) Dahl makes no provision for the use of specialized node C 
governance to protect the interests of employees; and (4) Dahl appears to ignore the expropriation 
risks which his procedures would pose if applied where stockholders are located at node B. An eco- 
nomic assessment of the microanalytic details of economic organization is needed to bring out the 
strain between his assessment and mine. 
89. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, reach a similar conclusion. 
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too sweeping, but a systematic assessment of which constituencies have 
stronger claims and why has been missing."0 
Transaction cost economics regards the board of directors as a govern- 
ance structure, but only one of several. Whether a constituency should be 
actively represented on the board is examined with reference to the con- 
tracting model. The main implications are these: 
First, those who are associated with the firm in a node A relation have 
no need for supportive governance, whether it be of a board-connected 
kind or otherwise. Instead, market mediation suffices for these parties. 
Second, those who are associated with the firm in a node C relation 
have already crafted bilateral governance that is attuned to the idiosyn- 
cratic needs of the transaction. Unless there are significant gaps or defects 
in this bilateral governance, board participation is unnecessary. The main 
occasion for those with node C governance to be included on the board of 
directors is for information purposes. Labor may sometimes qualify, espe- 
cially when a firm is experiencing difficulties and is asking for givebacks. 
Suppliers who are engaged in a major firm-specific project and very large 
customers may also qualify. 
Third, those whose contracting relation is otherwise of a node B kind 
are in the greatest need of remedial governance. By its very nature, the 
contractual relationship between the shareholders and firm is difficult to 
safeguard. Providing stockholders with an ability to monitor the affairs of 
the firm and to replace the management in a crisis will arguably facilitate 
obtaining equity financing on superior terms. For this reason, the board of 
directors should be regarded principally as a governance instrument of the 
shareholders. Viewed in the context of the entire range of contractual re- 
lations, moreover, it is in the interests of all constituencies that voting 
board membership be reserved for those whose contractual relation to the 
firm is of a node B kind. 
It is difficult to craft governance structures for managers whose relation 
to the firm is highly specific. Management's presence on the board can 
improve the amount and quality of information and lead to superior deci- 
sions. But such a presence should not upset the board's basic control rela- 
tion with the corporation. 
The manner in which boards of directors in most major corporations 
are constituted and operated is broadly consonant with the efficient gov- 
ernance principles set out in this Article. Yet there are major differences. 
Management often plays a larger role in governance than the contractual 
framework dictates; boards are often pressed to go beyond a monitoring 
90. The treatment by Fama & Jensen, supra note 3, is an exception. It makes important headway 
in advancing the analysis of these matters. See Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness 
and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738 (1978) for an instructive discussion. 
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role to adopt a participative one; and corporations have been under eco- 
nomic and political pressure to extend board membership to various inter- 
est groups. In theory, the first two of these phenomena may result from 
the ex post settling-up processes. An alternative explanation is that these 
deviations are a reflection of the continuing presence of managerial discre- 
tion: Incumbent managements feel more secure and have greater latitude 
in participative boards which they dominate. 
Although the approach set out in this Article locates corporate govern- 
ance issues in a more general framework and permits the merits of the 
arguments that have been advanced on behalf of voting board representa- 
tion for the various constituencies to be evaluated in a more systematic 
way than earlier treatments, it is nevertheless limited in three respects. 
First, the binary treatment of safeguards into all (s k) or none (s 0) 
categories is a simplifying but arbitrary device. A more general treatment 
would recognize that safeguards are costly to provide and that s is a con- 
tinuous, rather than a discrete, variable. If the optimal choice of s is less 
than k, then a residual degree of risk remains. The possibility that mem- 
bership should be awarded to such constituencies at least warrants further 
discussion. Additionally, the entire argument proceeds within the conven- 
tional context of a "one-tier" board. In a two-tier board, one level is con- 
cerned with operating rules and practices while the second deals with 
overall resource allocation and the assessment of strategic decisionmaking 
and control. Efforts to effect co-determination using such a board have not 
been addressed. 
Finally, the discussion assumes throughout that, once struck, all node C 
bargains will thereafter be respected. This ignores the possibility that cir- 
cumstances will change and that departure from the spirit, if not the let- 
ter, of the contract will sometimes follow. For example, the resolve of a 
regulatory commission to set rates at a level that yields a fair rate of re- 
turn may weaken if regulated firms do not have recurring needs to resort 
to capital markets for expansion and renewal capital.91 The same applies 
to stockholders in a firm that has no need for equity financing. Although 
management may have enthusiastically supported governance structure 
safeguards for the stockholders at the time the initial equity financing was 
secured in order to benefit from more favorable terms, it may subse- 
quently prefer relief from the monitoring pressures that such a node C 
bargain implies. If additional equity capital is not needed, the composition 
of the board may be altered to the disadvantage of the shareholders. To be 
91. Accordingly, a public utility that is financed by intermediate-term debt that is continuously 
rolled over is less subject to punitive rate setting than is an otherwise equivalent public utility that 
uses very long-term debt and has no need for renewal financing. In other words, how the rate setting 
process will be affected is a factor that should enter the calculus of the public utility. 
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sure, there are checks against such distortions, but assertions that "ex post 
settling-up" processes are always fully efficacious strain credulity. 
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